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Abstract
Negative stimuli do not only evoke fear or disgust, but can also evoke a state of ‘morbid fascination’ which is an urge to
approach and explore a negative stimulus. In the present neuroimaging study, we applied an innovative method to
investigate the neural systems involved in typical and atypical conceptualizations of negative images. Participants received
false feedback labeling their mental experience as fear, disgust or morbid fascination. This manipulation was successful;
participants judged the false feedback correct for 70% of the trials on average. The neuroimaging results demonstrated
differential activity within regions in the ‘neural reference space for discrete emotion’ depending on the type of feedback.
We found robust differences in the ventrolateral prefrontal cortex, the dorsomedial prefrontal cortex and the lateral
orbitofrontal cortex comparing morbid fascination to control feedback. More subtle differences in the dorsomedial
prefrontal cortex and the lateral orbitofrontal cortex were also found between morbid fascination feedback and the other
emotion feedback conditions. This study is the first to forward evidence about the neural representation of the experimen-
tally unexplored state of morbid fascination. In line with a constructionist framework, our findings suggest that neural
resources associated with the process of conceptualization contribute to the neural representation of this state.
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Introduction
Affective scientists, including neuroscientists, often study emo-
tional processes by presenting participants with negative
images and then observing the consequences. So far, the dis-
crete emotions that have dominated the research agenda are
typical experiences such as fear and disgust (e.g. Hariri et al.,
2002; Wright et al., 2004; Stark et al., 2007; Borg et al., 2013).
Nevertheless, people also experience fascination, interest or
curiosity when faced with negative events (Zuckerman and
Litle, 1986; Rime´ et al., 2005; Turner and Silvia, 2006). These
states have received no attention in affective neuroscience so
far, even though comparing the neural representation of fascin-
ation with those of fear and disgust provides an important op-
portunity to examine how the brain instantiates different
experiences that contain the same affective (i.e. valenced) infor-
mation. In this article, we present a novel neuroimaging study
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to assess the neural mechanisms that underlie labeling similar
negative stimuli as evoking fear, disgust or ‘morbid fascination’.
The brain basis of typical and atypical emotional
experiences
The Conceptual Act Theory of emotion (CAT; Barrett, 2006) ex-
plicitly predicts that the same affective stimulus (e.g. a negative
image) can lead to different subjective experiences of emotion
(e.g. fear, disgust, fascination) depending on a number of indi-
vidual and situational factors (Barrett, 2006; 2012; Lindquist and
Barrett, 2008). One underlying process that causes diversity in
subjective emotional experiences is called conceptualization,
and refers to the retrieval of context-relevant conceptual know-
ledge derived from previous experiences that shapes the way
that internal and external sensations are made meaningful (cf.
Barrett, 2013). Indeed, the CAT conceives of conceptualization
as an essential ‘ingredient’ in emotional experience, along with
sensory information from the world (exteroceptive sensations)
and sensory information from the body (interoceptive sensa-
tions) (Lindquist and Barrett, 2012).
In this study, we focused on how different conceptualiza-
tions of negative stimuli are supported by the ‘neural reference
space for discrete emotion’, a set of regions that is consistently
active when people experience discrete emotions (Kober et al.,
2008; Lindquist et al., 2012). We specifically predicted involve-
ment of the dorsomedial and ventromedial prefrontal cortex
(dmPFC and vmPFC) and the ventrolateral prefrontal cortex
(vlPFC), because the CAT argues that these regions support a
conceptualization function in emotion (Wilson-Mendenhall
et al, 2011; Lindquist and Barrett, 2012; Barrett and Satpute,
2013). Furthermore, there is ample research that demonstrates
a role for these regions when people generate subjective emo-
tional experiences (e.g. Wilson-Mendenhall et al, 2011;
Oosterwijk et al., 2012) or label/appraise affective or neutral
stimuli in emotional terms (e.g. Lieberman et al., 2007; Ochsner
et al., 2009; Satpute et al., 2013).
Interestingly, a recent study has further shown that these
same regions engage with relatively different strength when in-
dividuals generate experiences of atypical as compared with
typical experiences of emotion (Wilson-Mendenhall et al., 2014).
Wilson-Mendenhall et al. manipulated typicality by shifting the
valence of instances of fear, sadness and happiness (e.g. feeling
‘disturbing happiness’ when making a sarcastic jab at a col-
league or ‘energizing fear’ when performing at an important
sports match), and demonstrated that atypical experiences
relied more heavily upon regions that support a conceptualiza-
tion function. In this article we manipulate typicality in a differ-
ent way. We propose that fear and disgust are likely to be typical
ways of conceptualizing one’s reaction to a negative image dis-
playing mutilated bodies or crawling insects, whereas morbid
fascination, in contrast, is likely to be a more atypical way of
conceptualizing one’s reaction. In the case of negative stimuli,
morbid fascination is atypical because it combines negativity
with an intention to approach and explore. Moreover, although
morbid fascination may often be expressed in daily life (e.g. ‘rub-
ber-necking’ on a freeway to view a grisly accident), the term it-
self may not be often used to describe experiences of negative
events. At the very least, morbid fascination is not a ‘basic-level’
category of emotion that is learned early in childhood and regu-
larly used to describe modal unpleasant emotional experiences.
According to the CAT, conceptualization transforms non-
discrete affective experiences into experiences of discrete
emotions (such as fear, disgust or fascination) by integrating
internal sensations, external sensations and context-relevant
conceptual knowledge (Barrett, 2006, 2012). We hypothesize
that the atypical label of morbid fascination will draw upon the
process of conceptualization in a different way than the typical
labels of fear and disgust. First of all, at an implicit level, fear
and disgust are ‘efficient’ conceptualizations. This means that
the brain has a large sample of prior experiences that it can
draw from to integrate these labels with the sensory informa-
tion at hand. The label of morbid fascination, in contrast, re-
quires more elaborative conceptual processing because it is
used less often, and therefore has a smaller sample of ‘priors’ to
draw from. In addition, morbid fascination suggests a reconcili-
ation between a tendency to explore the informational content
of the stimulus and its negativity. In this context, sensations
may take on a more complex meaning, causing individuals to
continue to draw on conceptual information to iteratively pro-
cess the meaning of internal and external information.
The present study
We introduce a novel paradigm that presents false feedback to
direct the way participants conceptualize their experience of a
negative image. False feedback has been used across multiple
psychological contexts, including in social, clinical and neuro-
scientific studies. Previous applications of false feedback have
predominantly focused on false auditory feedback about the
participant’s heart rate (e.g. Valins, 1966; Wild et al., 2008). For
instance, Gray et al. (2007) found that false heart rate feedback
influenced participants’ affective judgments of neutral faces
and led to corresponding changes in the anterior insula and
amygdala. In the present experiment we did not provide partici-
pants with false feedback about their physiological state.
Instead, inspired by recent developments in the decoding of
mental states using brain imaging data (e.g. Haynes and Rees,
2006; Shirer et al., 2012) we led participants to believe that we
could decode the psychological meaning of their brain states in
real time. Subsequently, we gave participants false feedback
about the ‘content’ of their mental experiences when viewing
highly arousing, negative images. This allowed us to provide
participants with different labels (i.e. fear, disgust, morbid fas-
cination) to prime them to conceptualize their experience in a
certain way, without asking them to actively judge the images.
In the control condition, we told participants that the acquired
neural pattern precluded categorization of their mental state.
We chose to incorporate a non-specific label in the control con-
dition so that the presence of feedback was constant across
conditions—including the possibility for participants to reflect
upon the categorization of their state.
With this paradigm we tested the following hypotheses. First,
we tested whether regions in the neural reference space for emo-
tion (e.g. dmPFC, vmPFC, vlPFC) that support the process of con-
ceptualization engaged more strongly after participants received
emotion feedback (i.e. fear, disgust, morbid fascination) com-
pared with the control condition. Second, based on the previous
findings regarding the role of conceptualization in atypical emo-
tional experiences (Wilson-Mendenhall et al., 2014), we tested
whether these regions engaged more strongly when people
received morbid fascination feedback (i.e. an atypical state) as
compared with fear or disgust feedback (i.e. typical states).
Materials and methods
Participants
Participants were recruited from the Greater Boston Area
through an online advertisement. Potential participants were
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excluded if they had a history of psychiatric illness, were using
psychoactive or systemic medications or if MRI contraindica-
tions were present. Twenty-seven participants gave informed
consent according to the Partners Health Care Institutional
Review Board. Two participants did not complete the scanning
session because they felt uncomfortable in the scanner, and
one participant was excluded because of movement artifacts
(>3 mm motion across multiple time points across multiple
runs). Analyses were performed on the remaining twenty-four
participants (12 females, Mage¼ 24.7, SDage¼ 3.8). Participants
were paid $150 for their participation.
Manipulation
We manipulated experiential labels by telling participants
(falsely) that we could ‘read-out’ their mental experience while
they were viewing negative images in the scanner and that we
would give them feedback on this categorization. Three experi-
mental conditions combined negative images with disgust feed-
back, fear feedback and morbid fascination feedback to direct
conceptualization with a typical label (as ‘fear’ or ‘disgust’) or
with an atypical label (as ‘morbid fascination’). The ‘could not
be calculated’ condition served as a control condition in that it
kept the presence of a feedback cue constant, without providing
a label to direct conceptualization.
Our instruction proceeded as follows. First, we explained to
participants that we had ‘identified three specific brain states
that reliably predicted whether someone was experiencing fear,
disgust or morbid fascination’ and that the purpose of the study
was to validate these profiles. Then, we explained that the ex-
periment would start with three ‘collection runs’ to ‘capture
your brain state while you view the pictures’, followed by three
‘feedback runs’ that would give feedback about ‘what you were
experiencing when you saw the image for the first time’. We
further mentioned that when our algorithm could not find a
match, participants would receive ‘could not be calculated’
feedback. Furthermore, all participants were instructed to ‘pro-
long the state that you initially experienced when viewing the
picture’ (e.g. during the collection runs), ‘during the full duration
of the second viewing’ (e.g. during the feedback runs). The full
instruction can be found in the Supplementary Materials.
Because the manipulation incorporates deception, we used a
thorough debriefing procedure.
Procedure
The complete experiment consisted of two sessions 5 days
apart. In the first session the participants viewed and rated all
images presented in the study. In the second session the partici-
pants performed the experimental task in the scanner, viewed
and rated all images again and filled out questionnaires and an
exit interview. The rating task was programmed in MATLAB
and presented each image in combination with the following
five rating dimensions: threat, repulsion, interest, negativity
and emotional intensity. Ratings were made on a continuous
sliding scale with labeled endpoints (e.g., ‘not at all threatening’
and ‘extremely threatening’). To avoid response demand char-
acteristics, we deliberately chose words that indexed ‘world-
focused’ experiences of each emotion (Lindquist and Barrett,
2008), that were different from the terms used in the feedback
manipulation.
The scanning session consisted of six runs. In three passive
viewing runs (or ‘collection runs’) participants viewed 96 nega-
tive images, 24 positive images and 24 neutral images passively.
Positive and neutral images were intermixed with negative
images to prevent habituation to the highly aversive images.
Each trial presented a fixation cross for 3 s, followed by an
image for 3 s. Several 3–12 s jitter periods presenting a black
screen were intermixed with the trials. Jitter length and the
order of stimulus events was optimized using optseq (http://
surfer.nmr.mgh.harvard.edu/optseq/).
In three ‘feedback runs’, participants viewed 96 negative
images with feedback, and 24 positive and 24 neutral images
without feedback. Each trial started with a cue presented for 3 s.
Negative images were combined with a feedback cue that com-
bined a label (i.e. fear, disgust, morbid fascination or control)
with an artificially created image of brain activation (see section
on Stimulus Materials). Positive and neutral images were pre-
ceded by a ‘no feedback’ cue. Cues were followed by an image
presented for 3 s and 3–12 s jitter periods were intermixed with
the trials. In order to separately model the image-viewing
period from the feedback cue period, we included 24 catch trials
that presented feedback cues without a following image. See
Figure 1 for a visual overview of the paradigm.
To ensure that participants kept attending to the images,
participants were asked to press a button when the image on
the screen was surrounded by a red box. The red box appeared
twice per run around positive and neutral images. All runs were
programmed and presented in Eprime (Psychology Software
Tools).
The scanning session was followed by a second world-
focused emotion rating task. We reasoned that participants
who received morbid fascination feedback, for instance, would
be more likely to later rate those images as ‘interesting’ as com-
pared with ‘threatening’ or ‘repulsive’. We did not include trial-
by-trial ratings of world-focused emotions or feedback accuracy,
as this would have confounded the feedback manipulation with
an explicit judgement of the stimulus, or an explicit evaluation
of the label. Moreover, such an explicit evaluation may have
undermined our cover story. In addition to including post-
scanner ratings of world-focused emotions, we concluded the
session with a thorough exit interview to evaluate whether par-
ticipants believed that the feedback correctly identified their
mental state. We asked participants to ‘judge the percentage of
trials for which the feedback correctly identified your state’ on
an 11-point scale ranging from 0 to 100% for each of the experi-
mental feedback categories. Finally, the experimenter asked the
participant about the goal of the study. Only six participants
showed suspicion about the falsity of the feedback manipula-
tion. As we indicate below, our results did not differ as a result
of participants’ suspicion.
Stimulus materials
Images with a valence score <4.5 (i.e. negative) and an arousal
score >4.5 (i.e. high arousal) were selected from the
International Affective Pictures System database (Lang et al.,
2008). In order to exclude the possibility that differences in
strength and content between conditions could influence our
effects, we organized the images into four different lists that
were counterbalanced across the fear, disgust, morbid fascin-
ation and control feedback conditions. Lists did not differ in
mean valence, F(3, 95)¼ 0.70; P¼ 0.55, (Mlist1¼ 2.8, SE¼ 0.16;
Mlist2¼ 2.7, SE¼ 0.16; Mlist3¼ 2.8, SE¼ 0.16; Mlist4¼ 3.0, SE¼ 0.14),
nor in mean arousal, F(3, 95)¼ 0.72; P¼ 0.54, (Mlist1¼ 5.9,
SE¼ 0.11; Mlist2¼ 6.0, SE¼ 0.12; Mlist3¼ 5.8, SE¼ 0.12; Mlist4¼ 5.7,
SE¼ 0.16). Furthermore, lists were fully matched in terms of
specific content. Each list included an equal number of images
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portraying hand or head mutilations, burns, dead bodies, con-
flict scenes, skulls, attacking animals, weapons, car crashes, etc.
Feedback images were created in Photoshop. ‘Neural activ-
ity’ associated with the experimental feedback manipulations
was mimicked in three different patterns on a glass brain image
(see the Supplementary Materials for examples).
Scan parameters
Data were collected with a 3 T Siemens Magnetom trio MR scan-
ner with a 12-channel matrix head coil. We acquired a struc-
tural T1-weighted multi-echo MPRAGE image (van der Kouwe
et al., 2008) (TR¼ 2530 ms, TE1¼ 1.74 ms, TE2¼ 3.6 ms,
TE3¼ 5.46 ms, TE4¼ 7.32 ms, flip angle¼ 7, 1 mm3 voxels) for
structural registration and 816 T2* weighted functional images
(TR¼ 3000 ms, TE¼ 30 ms, flip angle¼ 90, FOV¼ 220 mm,
3.4 3.4 2 mm voxels) across six different runs.
Data analysis
The structural data were preprocessed using the standard
Freesurfer (http://surfer.nmr.mgh.harvard.edu/) protocol (Dale
et al., 1999; Fischl et al., 1999a,b). Functional pre-processing
included motion correction, slice time correction, spatial
smoothing (5-mm full-width/half-max), high-pass filtering (1/
128 Hz) and registration of the functional images onto the ana-
tomical scan. Hemodynamic responses were modeled with a
gamma function; the design matrix included motion param-
eters as nuisance regressors. Time-points with movement ex-
ceeding 2 mm were excluded from the analysis. Through the
inclusion of catch trials in the feedback runs, we were able to
separately model the feedback phase and the image phase
within each trial; analyses only focused on the neural responses
when participants were viewing negative images. A random ef-
fects analysis on the group level was performed to calculate
contrasts.
Hypotheses testing
To test our hypotheses we first created a mask representing ‘the
neural reference space for discrete emotion’ (cf. Lindquist et al.,
2012) that includes regions consistently active during emotion
experience. This mask combined the following surface-based
labels from the Desikan–Killiany cortical atlas (Desikan et al.,
2006): superior frontal, medial orbitofrontal, rostral and caudal
anterior cingulate, pars orbitalis, pars opercularis, pars triangu-
laris, lateral orbitofrontal and insula. In the first step, we identi-
fied significant clusters within the mask that reflected general
task activity. We selected clusters that survived a threshold pro-
vided by a Monte Carlo simulation within the contrast that com-
pared all conditions against a baseline consisting of the blank
screen jitter periods. In the second step, we extracted percent
signal change from each of these functionally defined regions of
interest (ROIs) for each of the feedback conditions separately.
For cluster selection we implemented a so-called leave-one-
out procedure (Esterman, Tamber-Rosenau et al., 2010) to refrain
from introducing circularity in our ROI analysis (Kriegeskorte
et al., 2009). More precisely, we created 24 ‘n1’ datasets that
included all participants minus one. Then, for each n1 dataset,
we performed a Monte Carlo simulation to select functional
clusters that reflected general task activity. All 24 datasets re-
vealed significant clusters in the left dmPFC/supplementary
motor area (SMA) and left vlPFC (vertex-wise P< 0.005; cluster-
wise P< 0.01), and in the left lOFC (vertex-wise P< 0.005; cluster-
wise P< 0.05). In the next step, for each participant that was left
out, we extracted percent signal change for each condition sep-
arately from the functional ROIs selected from the correspond-
ing n1 dataset (i.e. the dataset in which the participant was
left out). This data were then subjected to three separate re-
peated measures ANOVAs (Bonferroni-corrected) that tested
whether the extracted percent signal change was significantly
different between feedback conditions. Because of the novel na-
ture of our paradigm, we report uncorrected P-values for the
Fig. 1. Overview of the false feedback design. During the passive viewing runs, participants passively viewed negative, positive and neutral images. During the feedback
runs, participants received false feedback (i.e. ‘fear’, ‘disgust’, ‘morbid fascination’ or ‘could not be calculated’) preceding each negative image. Positive and neutral
images were combined with a preceding ‘no feedback’ cue.
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follow-up paired comparisons and note when these compari-
sons reached a Bonferroni-corrected level of significance.
Because previous research has shown decreased activation
of the amygdala when people label emotional stimuli (Hariri
et al., 2002; Lieberman et al., 2007), we also performed a func-
tional ROI analysis focused on the amygdala. This analysis did
not demonstrate any significant effects (see Supplementary
Materials). Furthermore, we performed exploratory whole brain
analyses for the contrasts comparing the feedback conditions
among each other, and each feedback condition with its corres-
ponding passive viewing trials. To balance type I and type II
error (Lieberman and Cunningham, 2009), we applied a cluster-
search threshold that identified clusters with a vertex-wise
threshold of P< 0.005 and a minimum cluster-size of 50 mm2.
Results
Accuracy judgments
In a first manipulation check, we analyzed the judged percent-
age of trials where participants believed the emotion feedback
correctly identified their mental state. This analysis demon-
strated that judged accuracy was equally high for fear
(M¼ 67.9%; SE¼ 4.7), disgust (M¼ 73.8%; SE¼ 3.6) and morbid
fascination (M¼ 67.1%; SE¼ 4.8) feedback, F(2, 46)¼ 1.18; P¼ 0.32.
This finding not only shows that our manipulation was success-
ful, but also that participants, on average, had few reservations
in applying different labels to very similar evocative images.
Subjective ratings
In a second manipulation check, we analyzed the ratings of
threat, repulsion and interest collected at Time 1 and 2 to test
whether feedback influenced ratings on the corresponding
‘world-focused emotion’ dimension (e.g. higher interest ratings
for images paired with morbid fascination feedback). A 2
(time) 3 (rating) 4 (condition) repeated measures ANOVA did
not reveal any significant effects (all P’s> 0.077), although the
means did show that ratings decreased from Time 1 to Time 2
in absolute terms. This is likely the result of habituation be-
cause subjects viewed the images for the first time at Time 1
(outside the scanner), and for the fourth time at Time 2 (after
viewing the images twice in the scanner during collection and
feedback runs).
Because habituation may have obscured the effect of the feed-
back manipulation in our overall analysis, we also performed a 3
(rating) 4 (condition) repeated measures ANOVA separately on
the ratings at Time 1 and Time 2. Importantly, there was neither
a main effect of rating, F(2, 44)¼ 1.96; P¼ 0.15 nor an interaction
between rating category and condition at Time 1, F< 1. These
findings suggest that on average, participants endorsed threat
(M¼ 50.4; SE¼ 4.6), repulsion (M¼ 56.7; SE¼ 3.8) and interest rat-
ings (M¼ 54.2; SE¼ 4.6) equally at the start of the experiment.
Critically, we did find a significant effect of the false feedback ma-
nipulation at Time 2, indicated by an interaction between rating
category and condition, F(6, 132)¼ 2.62; P¼ 0.02; g2¼ 0.11. As
shown in Figure 2, images combined with fear feedback produced
the strongest threat ratings; images combined with disgust feed-
back produced the strongest repulsion ratings and images com-
bined with morbid fascination feedback produced the strongest
interest ratings. Paired comparisons showed significant differ-
ences between fear and morbid fascination and fear and control
for threat, and between morbid fascination and control for inter-
est (P< 0.05, uncorrected).
ROI analyses
We tested the hypothesis that a negative image combined with
morbid fascination feedback would be associated with stronger
activation in the neural reference space for emotion than a
negative image combined with fear, disgust or control feedback.
First, based on an iterated leave-one-out Monte Carlo corrected
cluster search, we identified significant clusters in the dmPFC/
SMA, lOFC and vlPFC that reflected general task activity. Figure
3 contains a visual representation of the functionally defined
ROIs by presenting the conjunction of clusters produced by the
iterated leave-one-out cluster search. Table 1 contains the peak
coordinates and size of the clusters within this conjunction.
In the second step, we extracted percent signal change from
each of the functionally defined ROIs for each of the feedback
conditions separately. Figure 3 presents the means and stand-
ard errors for each feedback condition. As predicted, we found
that the left dmPFC/SMA was significantly modulated by the
feedback manipulation, F(3, 69)¼ 3.92; P¼ 0.036; g2¼ 0.15.
Consistent with our hypothesis, the dmPFC/SMA was more
strongly engaged after morbid fascination feedback than fear
feedback (P¼ 0.033), disgust feedback (P¼ 0.036) and control
feedback (P¼ 0.003). Disgust and fear feedback did not differ sig-
nificantly from the control condition (both P’s> 0.21). A similar
pattern was present in the left lOFC, F(3, 69)¼ 4.52; P¼ 0.018;
g2¼ 0.16, with stronger activation after morbid fascination than
after fear feedback (P¼ 0.022) and control feedback (P¼ 0.001).
The comparison between morbid fascination feedback and dis-
gust feedback was marginally significant (P¼ 0.074). Disgust and
fear feedback did not differ significantly from the control condi-
tion (both P’s> 0.12). The modulation of the left vlPFC by the
feedback manipulation was marginally significant, F(3,
69)¼ 3.53; P¼ 0.057; g2¼ 0.13. Paired comparisons demonstrated
that the vlPFC engaged significantly more after morbid fascin-
ation feedback (P¼ 0.004), fear feedback (P¼ 0.014) and disgust
feedback (P¼ 0.051) than after control feedback. Disgust and
fear feedback did not differ significantly from morbid fascin-
ation feedback (both P’s> 0.61). For each of the above functional
ROIs, the comparison between morbid fascination and control
feedback also passed a Bonferroni corrected level of
significance.
Interaction with accuracy judgments
A possible alternative explanation for our findings concerns the
individual variability in how people judged the accuracy of the
Fig. 2. Interaction between feedback condition (x-axis, vertical labels) and rating
category (x-axis, horizontal labels). Error bars represent standard errors.
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feedback. The patterns of neural activity that we found could
have been driven solely by the participants with low accuracy
reports, possibly because they were confused by the feedback.
In order to test this, we split our sample into two groups. One
group included participants that judged that ‘all’ feedback was
correct in 70% or more of the trials (n¼ 11). The other group
included participants that thought that ‘one or more’ of the
feedback types was correct in 60% or less of the trials (n¼ 13). It
is important to note that this latter group included all partici-
pants that showed any suspicion about the feedback manipula-
tion. We then re-ran all ROI analyses with group membership
as a between-subjects factor. None of analyses showed a signifi-
cant interaction effect (all P> 0.23, uncorrected).
Whole brain contrasts feedback
In addition to the ROI analyses, we also calculated whole brain
contrasts comparing the different categories of feedback dir-
ectly (see Table 2 for an overview). Consistent with the ROI ana-
lyses, we found that morbid fascination feedback activated the
vlPFC, dmPFC and lOFC more than control feedback.
Furthermore, the contrast between disgust feedback and control
feedback revealed a cluster in the left vlPFC. Comparing the con-
trol feedback to the emotion feedback conditions, we consist-
ently found clusters in the right temporoparietal junction (TPJ)
Fig. 3. Left: visual representation of functional ROIs (conjunction) in dmPFC/SMA, lOFC and vlPFC activated by the task. Right: mean percent signal change (error bars
represent standard errors) for images paired with disgust, fear, morbid fascination (fasc) and could not be calculated (notc) feedback, extracted from functional ROIs
produced by the iterated leave-one-out cluster search. †P<0.1; *P0.05; **P< 0.01.
Table 1. Representation of functional ROIs within neural reference
space for emotion
Region hemi max Size mm2 x y z k
dmPFC/SMA lh 2.81 140 7.3 28.5 42.4 241
lOFC lh 3.48 105 42.5 26.2 11.5 216
vlPFC lh 3.43 286 51.6 27.6 5.2 520
Note: Clusters reflect a conjunction across clusters produced by the iterated
leave-one-out Monte Carlo corrected cluster search. For a visual representation
of the clusters see Figure 3. k is size in vertices; coordinates are in Talairach
space.
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and the frontal pole. The contrasts that compared emotion
feedback conditions with one another demonstrated clusters in
the superior parietal lobule and fusiform gyrus for morbid fas-
cination vs fear feedback; clusters in the precuneus for morbid
fascination vs disgust feedback; and clusters in the precentral
gyrus for fear vs disgust feedback.
Whole brain contrasts with passive viewing
As a final examination of the effect of feedback, we compared acti-
vation patterns after each feedback condition with activation pat-
terns while people ‘passively’ viewed the same set of images (i.e.
during the ‘collection’ runs) (see Table 3 for an overview).
Consistent with the ROI analyses, we found that both disgust feed-
back and morbid fascination feedback showed increased activation
within the left vlPFC, compared with passively viewing the same
images. Morbid fascination feedback further demonstrated clusters
in the left dmPFC, dlPFC, lOFC, TPJ and precuneus (see Figure 4).
When comparing control feedback with passive viewing, we found
clusters of activation in the TPJ and precuneus. For passive view-
ing, we consistently found clusters in bilateral occipital lobe (e.g.
cuneus, pericalcarine and lingual gyrus) and superior parietal lob-
ule across all comparisons. This may reflect stronger visual pro-
cessing and spatial orientation when viewing images for the first
time in the scanner. In addition, for all conditions except for mor-
bid fascination, we found that passive viewing was associated with
increased activation in the right lOFC.
Discussion
This study documents novel evidence for the neural mechan-
ism that supports morbid fascination in reaction to negative
Table 2. Contrasts comparing emotion and control feedback
Contrast hemi max Size mm2 x Y z k Region
fear feedback vs control feedback lh no clusters
rh 2.94 64 4.5 35.3 30.5 145 Precentral
disgust feedback vs control feedback lh 3.59 78 49.6 0.7 39.1 135 Precentral
3.48 89 36.2 31.2 5.2 198 vlPFC
rh 3.28 87 57.8 18.5 4.1 167 Superior temporal
2.99 52 46.1 30.6 3.5 83 vlPFC
Fascination feedback vs control feedback lh 5.25 55 6.9 25.3 48.9 106 dmPC
4.08 59 36.4 30 5.8 112 vlPFC
3.98 176 34.9 48.5 56.2 443 Superior parietal
3.59 102 44.9 30.1 7.8 116 vlPFC
3.04 85 47.8 21.8 5.7 150 vlPFC
2.73 155 36.2 36.6 10.3 301 lOFC
rh 3.5 80 31.8 6.1 43.9 180 Precentral
3.35 169 26.9 50.5 46.9 376 Superior parietal
2.58 50 37.6 5 3 94 Insula
Control feedback vs. fear feedback lh no clusters
rh 4.2 60 4.5 35.3 30.5 145 Posterior cingulate
3.08 55 56 43.5 7.4 87 Middle temporal
3.07 76 23.8 56.4 3.8 94 Frontal pole
2.94 295 35 67.8 41.7 554 IPL/TPJ
2.62 59 48.5 49.9 30.9 117 IPL/TPJ
Control feedback vs disgust feedback lh no clusters
rh 3.89 72 49.1 49.8 31.1 145 IPL/TPJ
3.4 105 56.8 42.6 7 160 Middle temporal
2.95 54 12.1 53.8 20.6 109 Precuneus
2.75 50 23.5 56.7 3.1 61 Frontal pole
control feedback vs fascination feedback lh no clusters
rh 3.21 61 24 57 5.1 70 Frontal pole
2.77 86 37.3 62.9 46.5 164 IPL/TPJ
fear feedback vs disgust feedback lh 3.41 68 35.2 19.1 47.2 153 Precentral
rh no clusters
fear feedback vs fascination feedback lh no clusters
rh no clusters
Disgust feedback vs fear feedback lh no clusters
rh no clusters
Disgust feedback vs. fascination feedback lh no clusters
rh no clusters
Fascination feedback vs fear feedback lh no clusters
rh 4.31 97 16.7 62.2 51.8 168 Superior parietal
2.97 71 28.3 58.9 7.6 132 Fusiform
Fascination feedback vs disgust feedback lh no clusters
rh 2.38 52 8.7 55.8 21.4 85 Precuneus
Note: Clusters are significant at P<0.005 with a minimum cluster size of 50 mm2; k is size in vertices; coordinates are in Talairach space.
lOFC, lateral orbitofrontal cortex; dmPFC, dorsomedial preforontal cortex; vlPFC, ventrolateral prefrontal cortex; TPJ, temporoparietal junction; IPL, inferior parietal
lobe.
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images. To manipulate the way participants conceptualized a
negative image, we used a novel false feedback paradigm in
which we claimed to ‘decode’ participants’ psychological state
from their brain activity. In reality, we used the feedback as a
form of suggestion to direct how participants ‘might’ conceptu-
alize their experience of negative images in the moment. This
method allowed us to directly compare the relative involvement
of neural regions following morbid fascination, fear and disgust
feedback.
Behavioral results suggest that our manipulation was success-
ful: participants reported that the feedback was correct on the ma-
jority of trials. Moreover, an analysis of ratings after scanning
indicated that false feedback influenced participants’ subjective
experience of the negative stimuli. This difference was subtle, but
given that these ratings occurred well after the manipulation, they
may be a conservative estimate of the shift in participants’ experi-
ence caused by the feedback manipulation. It should be noted
that we deliberately decided not to include trial-by-trial ratings of
emotional experience or feedback accuracy during our task, as
this would have confounded the feedback manipulation with the
explicit evaluation of a stimulus or a label. These limitations not-
withstanding, we believe that the subtle change in participants’
world-focused emotional experiences, along with participants’
general agreement about the accuracy of the feedback, are sug-
gestive that our false feedback influenced participants’ emotional
reactions, just as priming emotion concepts shapes emotional ex-
periences in the behavioral literature (Schachter and Singer, 1962;
Lindquist and Barrett, 2008; Oosterwijk et al., 2010; Crum et al.,
2013; Kassam and Mendes, 2013).
Our results reflected different patterns of activation in the
neural reference space for discrete emotions, notably within re-
gions associated with conceptualization (i.e. the dmPFC/SMA,
lOFC and vlPFC). Consistent with our first hypothesis, the vlPFC
showed a trend towards increased activation following emotion
label feedback (i.e. fear, disgust, morbid fascination) as com-
pared with control feedback. This finding is consistent with re-
search observing vlPFC activation during labeling of emotional
feelings (i.e. ‘affect labeling;’ Lieberman et al., 2007; Satpute
et al., 2013), semantic retrieval more generally (Wagner et al.,
2001) and with constructionist predictions that language plays a
role in emotion production (Barrett, 2006; Lindquist et al., 2015).
Consistent with our second hypothesis, the dmPFC/SMA
showed increased activation following morbid fascination feed-
back, as compared with all other conditions. The dmPFC has
been implicated when individuals show increased attention to
their internal state (Satpute et al., 2013) and is also part of a dis-
tributed network of brain regions involved in representing se-
mantic knowledge (Binder et al., 2009). We thus interpret this
finding in line with the proposal of the CAT (Barrett, 2006, 2009)
that ‘atypical’ emotions prompt a relatively greater reliance on
conceptualization (Wilson-Mendenhall et al., 2014).
As a potential limitation, we should note that only the com-
parison between morbid fascination feedback and control feed-
back was significant at the most stringent level in our ROI
analysis. Whole brain contrasts comparing morbid fascination
feedback to control feedback and to passive viewing forwarded
highly similar results. This suggests that our strongest effects
result from comparing an atypical emotion label with the con-
trol condition, which did not explicitly require participants to
draw on knowledge about emotion categories. Nevertheless, we
chose to present and discuss all findings since we worked with
a novel paradigm that likely produced a subtle effect, both be-
haviorally and neurally. Participants were in no way instructed
to apply any feedback label or judge its accuracy during scan-
ning, which may have resulted in less robust patterns of activa-
tion than a more explicit instruction. These points
notwithstanding, the brain activity we observed in the func-
tional ROI analyses largely replicated the brain areas that are
consistently observed in emotion meta-analyses (Vytal and
Hamann, 2010; Lindquist et al., 2012) and in studies on affect
labeling (Lieberman et al., 2007; Satpute et al., 2013), suggesting
that our findings are reliable.
Consistent with our interpretation that morbid fascination,
as an atypical emotional state, involved increased conceptual-
ization, the dmPFC/SMA, vlPFC and lOFC clusters that demon-
strated strong involvement for morbid fascination feedback fell
within the boundaries of a so-called ‘default mode network’
(DMN) (i.e. Yeo et al., 2011; see also Oosterwijk et al., 2012). The
DMN is thought to support conceptualization by using represen-
tations of prior experience to make meaning of sensations in
the moment (Bar, 2009; Lindquist et al., 2012; Oosterwijk et al.,
2015). In line with this hypothesis, the DMN has been shown to
have increased task-related functional activity across a number
of different psychological processes, such as self-referential
processing (e.g. Kelley et al., 2001; Gusnard et al., 2001), semantic
judgments (e.g. Binder et al., 2009), and emotional experience
(Wilson-Mendenhall et al., 2011; Lindquist et al., 2012;
Oosterwijk et al., 2012). The suggestion that the default network
may be important in the construction of complex and atypical
states such as morbid fascination, is consistent with work that
demonstrates DMN activation for other types of information
that reflect atypicality, such as ambiguous or ambivalent stim-
uli (Jenkins and Mitchell, 2010; Nohlen et al., 2013). The possible
link between the DMN and the experience of fascination in gen-
eral is a topic of investigation that we aim to address in future
research.
Although we interpret our findings in terms of an increased
role for conceptualization in the experience of morbid
Fig. 4. Significant clusters (P<0.005; size> 50 mm2) when comparing viewing after fascination feedback with passively viewing the same images. PCC, posterior cingu-
late cortex; dmPFC, dorsomedial prefrontal cortex; dlPFC, dorsolateral prefrontal cortex; vlPFC, ventrolateral prefontal cortex; lOFC, lateral orbitofrontal cortex; TPJ,
temporoparietal junction; MTL, middle temporal lobe.
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Table 3. Contrasts comparing activation after feedback with activation during passive viewing
Contrast hemi max Size mm2 x y z k Region
fear feedback vs passive viewing lh No clusters
rh 3.17 54 35.8 17.9 31 115 Caudal middle frontal
2.54 52 47.6 53.7 44.1 110 Inferior parietal
passive viewing vs fear feedback lh 6.36 2973 26.6 62.8 7.2 5233 Cuneus/pericalcarine/lingual
4.72 143 19.9 60.3 53.7 322 Superior parietal
-2.73 66 24.1 43.7 3.5 151 Lingual
2.31 57 29.2 65 25.5 140 Inferior parietal
rh 7.62 2835 20.1 69.8 9.2 4815 Pericalcarine
3.34 97 44.8 32.5 4.7 166 Pars triangularis
3.31 77 20.7 56.1 49.8 151 Superior parietal
3.21 66 30.9 25.8 16.6 112 lOFC
3.06 56 22.6 7.9 56.9 102 Superior frontal
2.79 70 26.7 62 29.3 119 Superior parietal
disgust feedback vs passive viewing lh 2.92 63 39 38 2 86 dlPFC/vlPFC
rh 3.55 109 12 62 35.9 217 Precuneus
2.84 58 8.4 39.3 1.8 107 Rostral anterior cingulate
passive viewing vs disgust feedback lh 7.73 3765 3.2 72.4 17.2 6475 Cuneus/pericalcarine/lingual
3.54 182 17 61.9 56.8 409 Superior parietal
2.99 148 33.1 74 24 221 Inferior parietal
2.53 90 19.7 59.8 37.7 189 Superior parietal
rh 6.57 3575 18.7 34.1 6.1 6141 Parahippocampal
4.21 384 25.9 52.3 46.4 932 Superior parietal
3.04 106 34.5 75 21.8 169 Inferior parietal
3.01 80 32.8 23.9 17.4 140 lOFC
2.98 86 13 75.6 0.5 95 Lingual
2.87 203 43.2 70.8 19.8 318 Inferior parietal
2.85 132 21.4 80.1 24.7 195 Superior parietal
2.75 102 37 36.8 9.3 215 Parahippocampal
2.64 97 32.5 64.7 26.7 183 Inferior parietal
fascination feedback vs. passive viewing lh 4.71 249 5.7 64.4 40.4 488 Precuneus
4.23 251 31.6 55.9 37.4 531 IPL/TPJ
3.5 209 48.4 47.5 33.5 479 TPJ
3.5 178 40.1 42.7 8.2 240 lOFC
3.35 61 61.1 35.9 6.9 106 Middle temporal
3.26 60 46.9 58 41.7 151 IPL/TPJ
3.23 109 51.6 27.6 5.2 186 vlPFC
3.2 128 38.4 14.9 46.6 201 dlPFC
3.15 74 6.7 26.8 39.9 123 dmPFC
rh 4.7 249 7.2 65.8 38.5 510 Precuneus
3.75 200 39.8 53.4 40.8 443 Inferior parietal
2.42 63 14 90.3 16.2 80 Lateral occipital
passive viewing vs. fascination feedback lh 7.37 3124 26.4 60.1 7.5 5542 Precuneus
3.64 142 22.2 59 52 320 Superior parietal
rh 7.84 2722 16.7 65.1 12.2 4494 Pericalcarine
2.53 83 21.5 77.6 41.7 123 Superior parietal
notc feedback vs. passive viewing lh 3.8 142 37.8 63.8 45.6 293 IPL/TPJ
3.59 294 48.1 55.5 40.1 692 IPL/TPJ
3.2 66 40.6 13.7 38.6 86 dlPFC
3.17 116 46.4 54.6 26.7 257 IPL/TPJ
3.06 70 11.3 49.3 37.7 134 Precuneus
2.85 129 5.7 63.3 39.2 256 Precuneus
rh 3.93 731 42.7 59.1 41.5 1524 Inferior parietal
3.46 60 38.6 23 33.1 120 Caudal middle frontal
3.45 82 9.1 66.4 39.3 170 Precuneus
3.41 73 17.1 96.5 13.4 98 Lateral occipital
passive viewing vs. notc feedback lh 7.61 5305 14.3 78.4 12.7 9298 Pericalcarine
6.05 139 30.7 47.3 49.4 330 Superior parietal
5.16 62 44.3 0.8 18.3 155 Superior temporal/ATL
4.13 58 17 58.8 59.6 135 Superior parietal
3.93 63 32.6 50.3 5.8 131 Fusiform
3.39 83 36.4 36 10.1 145 lOFC
2.97 84 43.8 69.4 14.2 158 Inferior parietal
(continued)
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fascination, our findings are also consistent with an interpret-
ation in terms of an increased role for ‘top-down’ interpretative
processes (e.g. reappraisal). For example, previous research has
observed patterns of activation in the dmPFC/SMA, lOFC and
vlPFC when individuals regulate their emotional state by reap-
praising the meaning of a stimulus (Wager et al., 2008; Diekhof
et al., 2011; Buhle et al., 2013) or interpret neutral stimuli as
negative (Ochsner et al., 2009). Thus, the relatively stronger acti-
vation of the dmPFC/SMA and lOFC for morbid fascination feed-
back may suggest a link between the experience of fascination
and reappraisal specifically. This link may have been empha-
sized by our instruction, which mentioned that morbid fascin-
ation could be interpreted as a state in which people ‘get drawn
to a stimulus to examine the details’. Although this systematic
way of viewing the stimulus is similar to the instructions that
people receive in a reappraisal paradigm, it is also a characteris-
tic of the mental state of fascination itself. Note, furthermore,
that our instruction did not ask people to reappraise the nega-
tivity of the stimulus, nor to down-regulate their emotions.
It is important to note that conceptualization and re-
appraisal account are not mutually exclusive. In fact, conceptu-
alization has been offered as a mechanism for achieving
reappraisal (Barrett et al., 2014). We argue that paradigms in
which participants are instructed to reinterpret a stimulus ‘top-
down’ are in fact evoking a re-conceptualization of the sensory
information present in that particular situation. Moreover, re-
gions involved in emotion regulation (Buhle et al., 2013; Diekhof
et al., 2011) are also commonly involved during emotion experi-
ence (Vytal and Hamann, 2010; Lindquist et al., 2012). Thus, the
patterns of activation found in the present study may also re-
flect the production of emotional reactions afresh. Ultimately,
there may not be a strict division between the mechanisms
involved in creating an emotion in the first place or modifying it
after the fact (cf., Gross and Barrett, 2011; Lindquist et al., 2012;
Ochsner et al., 2012).
Limitations
As the first study to use false mental state feedback, our study
has several limitations. A first possible limitation concerns our
choice of control condition. Although we deliberately chose to
include a condition with a non-specific label, this could have
led participants to give trials with this type of feedback reflect-
ive scrutiny (e.g. ‘What am I actually feeling?’), resulting in
increased activity in regions associated with conceptualization.
Thus, the comparison between emotion feedback and control
feedback is likely conservative, which may explain why we only
found a significant difference between fear, disgust and control
feedback in the VLPFC. Nevertheless, morbid fascination
feedback could also have resulted in self-reflective thoughts
(‘Why am I fascinated by this image?’), thus matching morbid
fascination and control feedback in this regard. In short, al-
though there may be psychological implications of the control
condition, these differences cannot explain the different pat-
terns of neural activation following control feedback and mor-
bid fascination feedback.
Second, there may be possible psychological consequences
of giving people (false) morbid fascination feedback that could
have influenced the patterns of neural activation in this study
(e.g. by causing doubt, surprise). In this context, it is important
to note that additional analyses suggested that our results did
not differ between participants who reported that the labels
were accurate descriptions of their feelings and those who re-
ported low accuracy of the feedback. Although null findings are
hard to interpret, this provides some support for the assump-
tion that the patterns forwarded by our study were not merely
driven by participants who were confused or in doubt about the
veracity of the feedback labels. Nevertheless, as a future direc-
tion, it is important to replicate the current findings by targeting
the non-manipulated experience of morbid fascination.
Finally, although our experimental design presented fear,
disgust and morbid fascination as mutually exclusive states, it
is likely that these experiences often co-occur. The subjective
ratings collected at Time 1 indeed demonstrated that the
negative images were rated equally in terms of threat, repul-
sion and interest, suggesting that experiencing a stimulus as
disgusting does not preclude experiencing that stimulus as
interesting. The integration of multiple experiences towards
negative images, and an understanding of how these experi-
ences develop over time is an important avenue for future re-
search. Another important side note is that the present
findings do not speak to the possible differences or similarities
in how the brain represents fascination for negative stimuli,
and for positive or non-emotional stimuli. Incorporating such
a comparison was beyond the scope of the present project, but
we believe that this is another important topic for future
research.
Conclusion
To summarize, using an innovative paradigm, this study docu-
ments the neural mechanisms underlying atypical and typical
experiences towards negative images. Our findings provide an
important starting point for future research into the experience
of morbid fascination and emphasize that it is relevant to take
this state into consideration when investigating reactions to
negative events.
Table 3. Continued
Contrast hemi max Size mm2 x y z k Region
2.77 91 46.5 58.4 3.8 160 Middle temporal
2.66 59 16.8 35.3 48.4 153 Paracentral
rh 6.54 5531 25.8 71.5 26 9247 Superior parietal
4.03 138 30 40.2 13.4 300 Fusiform
3.85 72 42.6 54.4 14.5 173 Inferior parietal
3.02 56 7.2 7.5 48.7 110 Superior frontal
2.56 61 41.1 27.8 12.6 83 lOFC
Note: Clusters are significant at P<0.005 with a minimum cluster size of 50 mm2; k is size in vertices; coordinates are in Talairach space.
lOFC, lateral orbitofrontal cortex; dlPFC, dorsolateral prefrontal cortex; dmPFC, dorsomedial preforontal cortex; vlPFC, ventrolateral prefrontal cortex; ATL, Anterior
temporal lobe; TPJ, temporoparietal junction; IPL, inferior parietal lobe.
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